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Audrey Lorde stated with some regret and certainly with much anger
that, within western institutional frameworks, difference always
escaped conceptualisation that was not oppressive.1 As a rightful heir
to these concerns, Iris Marion Young devoted many of her writings
to analysing difference in addition to arguing that proper attention to
difference is crucial for a more just society. Class, social position,
gender, race, ethnicity, ability and sexual orientation are all human
variations that affect access to social and political institutions. 
While attention is fittingly directed at the challenges of the
pluralist state, which imply different cultural locations, I believe there
are other sources of difference which require attention: namely, age.
If age is currently mediatised, attention is focused on the possible
scarcity of resources, especially in health care, that will result from
an increased numbers of seniors. Consequently, reflection on age and
citizenship has been circumscribed to issues of distributive justice that
will be brought about by this demographic change. If the practical
implications of aging have gained attention, theoretical discussions of
the citizen usually omit considerations of age. In traditional liberal
democratic theories, the concept of the citizen is taken to be an ideal
devoid of such contingent particularities. I challenge this apparent age
neutrality and I support my claim by drawing on Iris Marion Young’s
critiques of universal citizenship and of the social institution of labour. 
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Two of Young’s articles on citizenship and group inequities are
central to my paper. First, I examine Young’s critique of the ideal of
universal citizenship which she puts forward in `Polity and Group
Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’. Second,
I examine the article `Equality of Whom? Social Groups and
Judgments of Injustice’; here, Young targets labour as a foundation-
al social institution which can disadvantage certain groups of indi-
viduals. I show that the first article redirects our thinking on citizen-
ship rights, while the second highlights some of the problematic
assumptions associated with the implicit notion of the citizen as a
productive labourer, and therefore, as an adult. Both articles support
my contention that the implicit concept of the citizen needs to be
brought to the fore, that it is problematic and needs to be critically
examined.
CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS
As T.H. Marshall explained, the understanding of citizenship has
evolved to encompass not only civil and political citizenship but also
social citizenship.2 Political citizenship is tied to an ideal of the citi-
zen as a self-governing individual and civil citizenship is linked to the
notion of a self-possessing one. In the 20th century, an acceptance of
the risks brought about by fluctuations in the market entailed a broad-
ening of the notion of citizenship to include social citizenship. In lib-
eral democratic theories, if the ideal of the citizen as self-possessing
is not always embraced, that of self-legislating is never questioned.3
There are historical reasons for this, but the notion of citizenship as
the right to self-determination is foundational to liberal democratic
theories of justice. This implies that the ideal of the citizen is strong-
ly correlated to that of a self-governing individual, which means, there-
fore, that of an adult with full mental competency. 
Recent feminist writings have challenged some of the assump-
tions implicit in theories of citizenship. In particular, such scholar-
ship has made evident the problems inherent in an uncritical accept-
ance of the ideals of the male bread winner and of productive work
that are implicit in the traditional meaning of citizenship.4 Some fem-
inist revisions propose to conceptualise the citizen as a carer instead
of a producer and some put forward the idea careful citizenship.5
This call for a broadening of the notion of the citizen is also echoed
in Young’s work.
UNIVERSAL CITIZENSHIP
Situated within a deliberative democratic framework attentive to polit-
ical participation, Iris Marion Young argues that traditional liberal the-
ories subsume difference to the detriment of true plurality. Treating
everyone the same does not imply equal treatment; in fact, it can only
lead to the perpetuation of oppression and, hence, injustice.6 In this
section, I show that her critique of universality helps to displace the
primacy of civil and political citizenship rights, leading to a more
complex understating of citizenship.
In `Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of
Universal Citizenship’, Young locates a difficulty in “[t]he assumed
link between citizenship for everyone, on the one hand, and the two
other senses of citizenship—having a common life with and being
treated in the same way as other citizens—on the other.” 7 An imped-
iment to the realization of genuinely universal citizenship is the con-
viction that persons should adopt a universal point of view and, fur-
thermore, that these laws and rules should apply to all citizens in the
same way (426). For Young, however, difference needs to be acknowl-
edged for true representation to take place, thus leading to a more
equitable society. 
Young argues that citizenship in its ideal of capturing every-
one must be sensitive enough to the differences that adversely affect
oppressed groups for it is only by acknowledging such differences
that they can be remedied. Adequate representation of the groups con-
stitutive of a particular society implies that institutional mechanisms
need to be implemented to organize, inform and facilitate input by
these groups into policies that directly affect them (413). The ideal
of citizenship may be a guiding one, but when applied to real situa-
tions in which oppression is present it can effectively obscure the
effects of such oppressive circumstances. 
Young’s article can be read as a prescription for legislative
reform. Affirmative action plans, for example, not only redress past
injustices, but for Young, are concrete measures that compensate for
“cultural biases of standards and evaluators used by schools or
employers” (424). However, I understand Young’s critique on a deep-
er level. Her point that these various meanings of citizenship can be
at odds with each other has theoretical implications for citizenship,
not only pragmatic ones.
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In her critique of the ideal of uniform political participation,
of the same formal rights for everyone, there is the implicit under-
standing that political citizenship is tied to civil citizenship. Those
with less property and status will not be heard in the political arena,
even if they have the same formal rights as their more endowed coun-
terparts. If less civil citizenship implies less than effective political
representation, it can also undermine the social citizenship rights of
disadvantaged groups that do not have proper representation to address
issues of direct concern to them.
If there are policies affecting single mothers, for example,
these women must be able to have input into the policies that affect
them, according to Young. By ensuring that these women have polit-
ical access and that such access is sensitive to their lived realities,
better policies can be formulated. Their increased participation will
not only enhance their civil and political citizenship but also their
social citizenship rights. For these mothers, these latter rights may be
the ones that affect them on a daily basis. Thus it can be seen, in
light of Young’s argument, that all three components of citizenship
are linked closely. 
Historically, only a property owner was entitled to political
participation. Gradually, property ownership and the right to vote
became dissociated. The ideal of universal citizenship implies that
civil and political citizenship rights do not interfere with each other.
However, Young’s critique of universal citizenship reveals that, in fact,
citizenship rights are not dissociated from each other; they do not
run in non-interfering parallel lines but can have detrimental or pos-
itive effects on one another. 
In neoconservative critiques of citizenship, social citizenship
rights are seen in opposition to civil and political citizenship rights;
accordingly, a citizen on welfare is not an authentic citizen.
8 
Once
again, Young draws our attention to the impact of citizenship rights
on each other. For example, if single mothers are given adequate
access to day care so that they can participate in policy forums, the
day care, which is a right of social citizenship, will increase the moth-
ers’ political participation. In addition, accessible day care and other
social programs can help women who are marginalised enter the labour
force, in a way that will not compromise their parenting; here social
citizenship rights enhance civil citizenship. Understood in this man-
ner, social citizenship rights are not the `poorer second cousins’ of
the more authentic civil and political citizenship rights. By empha-
sising the variability of access to meaningful participation at the social
and political level, Young calls for a more complex understanding of
citizenship rights that makes room for the complementarity of these
rights.9
PRODUCTIVE LABOUR
In `Equality of Whom? Social Groups and Judgments of Injustice’,
Young makes the case that an analysis of the inequalities between
groups as opposed to individuals is effective for locating structural
inequalities within a given society. Determining how such inequali-
ties occur implies that oppressive circumstances can be redressed.10
Her article is useful for an examination of the citizen, since it reveals
the type of citizen that is assumed to inhabit these social institutions. 
In order to make her argument, Young first needs to identify
the relevant structures since they “refer to the relation of basic social
positions that fundamentally condition the opportunities and life
prospects of the persons located in these positions” (14). Young iden-
tifies the same major social institutions which make up the basic
structure as the ones Rawls includes in his list, but she adds “the
basic kinds of positions in the social division of labor” (12). The
explicit recognition of labour as a potential source of structural
inequality is crucial. As feminist critiques of citizenship have shown,
linking productive labour to citizenship institutes a hierarchy that priv-
ileges wage earners. Thus Young is in agreement with Lister, Fraser
and Gordon, and Tronto, to name a few theorists, who argue that
those who labour primarily in the private sphere are disadvantaged
since citizenship is tied to a male bread winner model of citizen-
ship.
11
Productive labour as the gateway to citizenship is problemat-
ic for those who labour outside such a paradigm. The implicit notion
of the citizen as wage earner creates unjust conditions for those, usu-
ally women, who perform unpaid care work in the home. This dis-
advantage is reflected in public policies that fail to recognize the
importance of unwaged care labour. For example, parents who have
taken time off waged work to care for children will not have the same
pensions as individuals who did not take any leave. 
Feminist proposals that focus on the recognition of caring
activities as being as worthy of access to citizenship rights as pro-
ductive labour posit, nevertheless, the citizen as an active agent. Thus,
whether the citizen is a productive adult or a universal carer, she is
67
ARTICLES
ARTICLES
L E S  A T E L I E R S  D E  L ’ É T H I Q U E   È V .  2  N .  1   È P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G  2 0 0 7
always an adult who is active. Although I am in agreement with these
critiques, I want to make a stronger claim, however, and suggest that
those who are neither workers nor carers are also adversely affected.
Put differently, if the group which is disadvantaged is the one that is
outside the paradigm of productive labour, it includes not only those
who perform care work, but also individuals who are not yet work-
ers, are no longer workers or will never be workers. 
Young’s analysis helps to locate the groups disadvantaged by
the institution of labour. It not only highlights the inequities gener-
ated by social structures that rely on the paradigm of productive
labour, it also reveals that those who are neither caregivers nor pro-
ducers are also in potentially oppressive circumstances. 
CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS
The notion of the citizen implicit in traditional liberal democratic the-
ories and in the various critiques of these theories is that of an adult
who is active, either as a carer or a producer. The implication of the
citizen as a producer or a carer is that this ideal citizen is an adult
who does not age, since this individual is never posited outside the
paradigm of activity. Thus the citizen is a perpetual adult. My claim,
therefore, is that the concept of the citizen inherent in the theories and
critiques viewed thus far is that of an active adult and that, further-
more, this adult never ages.
To understand the implications of my claim, it is useful to look
at the rights of citizenship. In the first article cited, Young highlights
the interactive aspect of citizenship rights. In traditional liberal demo-
cratic theories, however, the rights of citizenship are assumed to be in
a static relationship to the citizen herself. That is, civil and political
rights are taken to be rights of citizenship which all citizens possess
and it is assumed that social citizenship rights can be accessed under
the proper circumstances. It is informative to focus on this latter right.
Social citizenship rights are understood to manage risk; they act as a
safety net against the vagaries of the market. However, as seen ear-
lier, social citizenship rights actually do more than simply manage
risk; they can enhance political and civil citizenship rights. Young’s
critique of universal citizenship reveals that traditional theories
obscure the interconnection of the various rights of citizenship. 
A different understanding of citizenship rights also necessi-
tates a reconceptualisation of the citizen. At birth, a citizen has rights
of civil and social citizenship but not rights of political citizenship
such as voting rights. This will change as she ages; therefore, how
she accesses these rights and which ones become of prime impor-
tance will vary throughout her life. I am suggesting, therefore, that
a concept of the citizen should be responsive to the realities of infan-
cy, old age, and of the varying capacities of individuals, and should
not privilege a short period of adulthood. 
CONCLUSION
Young’s work is innovative because it uncovers the relational aspect,
whether of citizenship rights or of basic social institutions at play
within theories of justice. This, I believe, is a major achievement that
needs to be further explored. Making use of her writings, I have start-
ed this inquiry by examining the structural deficits brought about the
privileged status of wage labour. In light of this, I have argued that
the value placed on productive work casts individuals who do not fit
the category of productive labourer as citizens of lesser status. This
is problematic for an understanding of citizenship that is inclusive;
as Young saw it, inclusiveness should be a constant concern for a just
society. 
This worry is not limited to philosophers. Reflecting on poli-
cies directed at care giving, social theorists Kemp and Glendinning
caution that “[t]he emphasis on paid employment…as the main route
out of poverty and social exclusion at an individual level, risks mar-
ginalising those who cannot work because of illness; who have exit-
ed the labour market because of age; or who prioritise looking after
close relatives (children or older people) because of normative beliefs
or a perceived lack of alternate options.”
12
Some of the problems identified by Okin and Kittay pertain-
ing to the family and dependency are tied to the foundational notion
of the citizen as an adult.13 As Kittay has argued, individuals who are
not working adults are nonetheless present in society and theories of
justice need to take them into consideration. However, it is only by
recasting the notion of citizen that such structural deficits can final-
ly be addressed. The citizen conceptualised as an adult links the for-
mulation of citizenship rights to a type of social participation that is
quite limited; it fails to capture the realities of the citizen as she ages
from birth to death. Therefore, in order  in order to capture the com-
plexity of the relationship of citizenship rights and the lived realities
of individuals, the concept of the citizen needs to be broadened from
that of an ageless active adult to one who shares a social space14. 
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NOTES
1 Audrey Lorde, `Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefine Difference’ in Sister
Outsider, (Freedom, California: The Crossing Press, 1984), pp. 114-123.
2 T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and other Essays (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1950).
3 As evidenced by the numerous discussions between communitarians, libertarians
and welfare liberals.
4 See the writings of Ruth Lister for her critique of the male bread winner para-
digm. Linda Gordon and Nancy Fraser, as well as Joan Tronto examine the issues
surrounding care and care labour. There are other critiques worth noting such as
the implicit heteronormativity in theories of citizenship.
5 Proposed by Fraser and Lister respectively.
6 This is the thrust of her book Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990).
7 Iris Marion Young, `Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of
Universal Citizenship’ in Feminism and Politics, Anne Phillips, ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), 402.
8 Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon discuss this.
9 
Because her focus is on participation, Young privileges the notion of citizen as
self-determining. I cannot engage this issue in this short paper but it is worthy of
further analysis.
10 Iris Marion Young, `Equality of Whom? Social Groups and Judgments of
Injustice’, Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2001, pp. 1-18.
11 I put such individuals in a group because they are treated in that manner by
social policies; however, they are diverse. Here I cannot address the impact of race
and class which are important. 
12 Caroline Glendinning and Peter A. Kemp, Cash and Care, (Bristol: Policy Press,
2006), p.6. 
13 Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family, (New York; Basic Books,
1989); Eva Feder Kittay, Love’s Labor (New York: Routledge, 1999).
14 I am only gesturing to this new concept here; however, I develop this more fully
elsewhere.
69
ARTICLES
ARTICLES
L E S  A T E L I E R S  D E  L ’ É T H I Q U E   È V .  2  N .  1   È P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G  2 0 0 7
